Scholarly literature on Socrates and the Socratics is growing constantly and steadily. The number of editions, translations, monographs, collections and articles is increasing from year to year, contributing to a boost of knowledge about Socrates and his pupils as well as to new ways of interpreting such knowledge. Well established hermeneutical paradigms spanning from Olof Gigon’s ‘skeptic’ approach to Gregory Vlastos’ account of the ‘two Socrateses’ have been challenged and reassessed, often with the explicit aim to discover new means to deal with the texts of the first-generation Socratics.

One of the most recent and fruitful approaches concerns the way these sources are handled. Giannantoni’s collection, however successful in providing access to the fragments of the ‘minor’ Socratics, remained a work for specialists. It was hardly used by non-classicists mainly because the texts were neither translated nor thoroughly commented. Now, after two decades, things have changed radically: editions and translations, mostly drawing and selecting material from the *Reliquiae* (in some cases even integrating them) have appeared or are due to appear in different languages.

Parallel to this phenomenon is the spawning of collections of papers devoted to Socrates and the Socratics. We now have three *Companions* to Socrates: after that published by Blackwell in 2006, a Cambridge and a Bloomsbury Companion have ap-

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1 In this paper I sketch out the major trends characterizing Socratic scholarship in the past three years. For a survey reaching until 2010 see Stavru & Rossetti (2010).


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 appeared, and a Brill volume with contributions reaching from 5th Century literature on Socrates to Libanius is in preparation. Important collections of essays by major scholars on Socrates have also appeared: two valuable volumes feature the works that Klaus Döring and Andreas Patzer wrote over the last decades, thus providing comprehensive overviews of their approaches to the Socratic literature. The same importance applies to the books by Gabriel Danzig and Livio Rossetti, although in these collections the contributions go back to a shorter period of time.

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6 This Companion-like volume is expected to come out in 2014 for Brill (eds. F. de Luise, C. Moore, A. Stavru), with contributions on Socrates as seen by the Comics, the Sophists, the Socratics, the Peripatus, Hellenism, Roman Empire, Middle Platonism, Diogenes Laertius, Neoplatonism, and Libanius.


Even more collections are awaited as proceedings of conferences which took place or are due to take place in the near future. Since 2011 the *Sokratische Gesellschaft* holds its annual meetings every April in Würzburg, and publishes the results of them in the *Mitteilungen der sokratischen Gesellschaft* (last issue: nr. 52, 2013). In September 2013 (26-28) a conference devoted to ‘The Philosophical Relevance of the Minor Socratic Schools’ was held in Soprabolzano (Italy), another one took place in Aix-en-Provence (France) from December 7-8 (2013) on ‘Socrates at the Agora: What Purpose Does Philosophical Dialogue Serve Today?’, and other events are scheduled for summer 2014 in Tel Aviv (Israel), on ‘Plato and Xenophon: Comparative Studies’ and Portland (Oregon).

A major ongoing project to be mentioned in this context is that financed by the French *Agence Nationale de Recherche* (*‘Socrates: sources, traditions, usages. Pour une herméneutique du socratisme de l’Antiquité à la fin du Moyen Âge’*). It is coordinated by Dimitri El Murr in Paris. Its main aim is to translate into French Giannantoni’s *Reliquiae* and, where necessary, to improve on that edition. The first year of activity (November 2010-December 2011) has been entirely devoted to the Socrates of Aristotle (which have been translated and commented upon by D. El Murr), on which a workshop has been held in Paris, March 29-31, 2012.

Scholarly activities on Socrates are constantly increasing, and one may only wonder where this development will eventually lead. Socratic scholarship has become extremely

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1. ‘Socrates und die Kunst’.
2. President of the *Sokratische Gesellschaft* is Michael Erler. Among the papers on Socrates and/or the Socratics published or due to be duly published in the *Mitteilungen* are: A. Stavru (2013), K. Döring (‘Socrates und die Musik’, forthcoming 2014), M. Steinhart (‘Ein Bild von Sokrates’, forthcoming 2014), E.M. Kaufmann (‘„Nur die Weisen können tun, was sie begehren“? Facetten der Socrates-Ikonographie’, forthcoming 2014).
5. Nicholas D. Smith is organizing an ‘NEH Summer Seminar on Socrates’ at the Lewis & Clark College Portland, June 22-July 25.
6. See footnote 2 for more details on the translation work done. For updates see the ANR-website run by Lucia Saudelli, which contains a useful Socratic bibliography: http://socrates.hypotheses.org/.
variegated and dynamic. Approaches, methodologies, sometimes even the topics treated are new and original, thus enriching and refreshing a whole field of studies. But let us look in detail what kind of topics the scholarship is currently dealing with.

Crucial for understanding the role played by Socrates and his movement in the 5th and 4th centuries is to trace the elements which led to the birth and raise of a new prose genre in Greek literature, the Sôkratikoi logoi. It is important to note that this genre did not arise ex nihilo: many of its characteristic features, such as the author’s reluctance to state explicitly his ideas, or even to identify with them, can be found in a whole generation of sophoi: as Livio Rossetti suggests, a red thread seems to hold together Zeno of Elea, the Sophists, Socrates, and the first-generation Socratics. Indeed, many hints point to an interplay between the texts of the Sophists and those of the Socratics. Andrew Ford, who is working on this topic since 2006, maintains that Socratic literature derives not from fifth-century mime or drama (as commonly acknowledged on the grounds of Aristotle’s testimony), but from the context of the burgeoning rhetorical literature of the period. A similar position is held by David Murphy, who, by claiming that the Sôkratikoi logoi are not grouped with mimetic genres, shows that these form instead a genre on their own. Their influence on Isocrates is patent, as Murphy suggests, since his speeches respond to views that “can only have come from dialogues.” The uniqueness of the Socratic dialogue is a feature pointed out also by Luigi Maria Segoloni, according to whom the plokê of dialogue, i.e. its mixture of different genres, reflects its hybrid nature, being at the juncture between literature and philosophy. This accounts for the autonomy of dialogue, which obeys to its own rules, and not to those of other literary genres. In fact, there is no doubt that dialogue is essential for defining the literary production of the Socratics. Klaus Döring dwells on the well-known fact that besides Aristippus all the major Socratics wrote dialogues, whose prime purpose was not to provide accounts of conversations that actually took place, but to discuss, through fictitious reconstructions, philosophical issues in the same manner in which Socrates did.

A major problem in dealing with the Sôkratikoi logoi is that only those of Plato and Xenophon survive complete. Of the other Socratics we have only fragments: in some cases significant ones (as Aeschines’ Alcibiades, Aspasia and Miltiades, and Phaedo’s Zopyrus), in other cases scarce ones or even nothing at all. This lack of primary sources makes it difficult to determine the exact amount of the Socratic literature and thus to identify the group of the Socratics: Debra Nails’ reconstruction, however helpful, leaves many questions open as to the extension and the qualifying features of the Socratic circle. On the issue of who may be qualified as a Socratic and who not – an issue which still deserves to be tackled systematically – Christopher Rowe and Voula Tsouna provided insightful reflections in recent papers.

Another way to deal with the lack of primary sources is to look at the literary context in which these are embedded, so as to broaden the picture and understand the general

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18 Rossetti (2012), which develops on ideas formulated in (2010a).
19 Ford (2006), (2008), and (2010).
20 Murphy (2013), 312.
21 Segoloni (2012). A similar approach can be found also in Segoloni’s paper in this volume.
22 Döring (2011).
23 Nails (2002).
24 C. Rowe, ‘The first generation Socratics and the Socratic schools’ and V. Tsouna, ‘Plato’s representation of the Socratics and their circle’, papers held at the Soprabolzano conference mentioned above.
features of that context. It is, for example, instructive to observe the way the Socratics deal with the Homeric texts. Chapters of a recent book by Silvia Montiglio dwell extensively on Antisthenes’ and Plato’s pictures of Odysseus. Anthisthenes’ defense of Odysseus’ polytropia is the first extensive endorsement of the hero’s character we have in Antiquity. Montiglio claims that Antisthenes probably inherited his appreciation for Odysseus from his teacher, Socrates, whose admiration for Odysseus is likely to be historically founded. It is interesting to note that in Plato Odysseus is a more complex figure, bearing positive as well as negative aspects: in the myth of Er for example, he is reborn as a philosopher in order to remove the troublesome sides of his personality. A paper by Naoko Yamagata shows the use Plato and Xenophon make of Homeric quotations and references. It is striking that Plato, though criticizing epic poetry, introduces Homeric references far more often than Xenophon, who in the majority of his writings makes little use of Homer. The exception to this comes in Xenophon’s Socratic writings, where Socrates frequently recalls Homeric references in order to criticize epic poems and rhapsodes (this does not apply to the Oeconomicus, however, where we have virtually no reference to Homer). Yamagata explains this difference by concluding “that the historical Socrates probably did use Homeric references frequently in his conversation, as reported by both Plato, who loves Homer, and Xenophon, who is not normally keen to quote Homer.” Plato’s relationship toward Homeric poetry is complex: on the one hand he cannot avoid citing and using it, on the other he thoroughly attacks it. Recent studies focus on this ambivalence, which is of crucial importance not only for some famous passages of the Republic (II, III and X), but also for the juxtaposition of philosophy and poetry we find in the Ion, a dialogue possibly belonging to the beginning of Plato’s literary production. The ‘Ancient Quarrel’ between philosophy and poetry is debated in a number of recent works dwelling mainly on the Ion. References to Homer and poetry seem to play a key role also in other dialogues, reaching until the very last phase of Plato’s production (e.g. in Hippias Minor, Symposium, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Laws). Looking at the literary context in which the Socratic logos were written helps us gain insights about their tendency to follow a general trend toward mixing genres that becomes

Montiglio (2011).

26 Yamagata (2012), 144. It is important to note that Polycrates openly accused Socrates of availing quotations from Homer in a tendentious manner (e.g. Xen. Mem. 1.2.56 and 58). On the use of ‘Odyssiac’ rhetoric in Xenophon Mem. 4.2 see the contribution by Cristiana Caserta in this volume.

27 Destrée & Herrmann (2011).

28 The Ion may have even been written when Socrates was still alive (as e.g. Heitsch 2003 and 2004 claims), a possibility that seems to back the hypothesis of an “historical Socrates” keen on using frequently references to Homer in his teaching.


30 Adams (2010).


32 McPherran (2012b).


34 Laks (2011).
particularly evident in the sophistic literature. An interesting paper by Rachel Ahern Knudsen sheds light on the multiple links connecting poetry, rhetoric and philosophy by examining four hybrid model speeches: Gorgias’ *Defense of Palamedes*, Antisthenes’ *Ajax* and *Odyssey*, and Alcidamas’ *Odyssey*.

A similar approach can be noticed in the already mentioned article by David Murphy, whose concern is to connect passages in Isocrates to dialogues of Hippias, Antisthenes, and Plato. By observing the phenomenon of the *Sôkratikoi logoi* from the perspective of sophistry, and in particular of Isocrates, this paper succeeds in showing how dialogues were understood outside the Socratic circle.

Another essential viewpoint on Socrates and the Socratics is that of Aristophanes. Various approaches to his portrait of Socrates have been attempted: one is to compare what we find in the *Clouds* with the topics discussed in the *Sôkratikoi logoi*, taking as authentic only what is compatible with these; the other is to look beyond the exaggerations and distortions of Comedy and search for doctrines which are not attested in the writings of the Socratics. David Konstan follows the latter option, coming to the conclusion that “Aristophanes assembled a hodge-podge of intellectual pursuits, from eristic argumentation to speculation about the gods, astronomy, meteorological phenomena, biology, poetry, and grammar, and combined them all in Socrates… Aristophanes’ Socrates was a compound figure, combining characteristics of Protagoras (grammar), Damon (metrics: cf. Plato *Republic* 400a), Hippo of Elis (sky as lid), and Diogenes of Apollonia, who made air the arch-principle of all things”. These connections are explored in three learned papers that provide hints useful to clarify the historical background of the meteorological doctrines Aristophanes mocks at. It is for instance unclear whether and to what extent these doctrines should be attributed to Diogenes or Archelaus, how they relate to each other, and if they should be understood in the context of Presocratic physiology. In fact, a variety of bodies of knowledge are attributed to Socrates and his disciples in the *Clouds*. It is plausible that Aristophanes not only had a clear idea of the ‘academic’ disciplines which were taught in Athens in his time, but that he expected also his public to have such an idea. There are convincing arguments for thinking that Aristophanes did not provide a purely fictional account of Socrates, as a completely unrealistic portrait would have yielded no comic effect. On the contrary, there is evidence that the *Clouds* influenced profoundly the common opinion on Socrates even many years after their rehearsal, fueling the hostile feelings which led to the accusations brought against him in 399. Following up on this, Giovanni Cerri claims that there are solid grounds to believe that the Socrates of the *Clouds* sticks to the ‘historical’ Socrates. Since we have parallel issues in Aristophanes’ and in the Socratics’ portraits of Socrates, and as it is difficult to assume that the latter were relying on the former, it is possible to infer that “both derive from the same source:

35 Knudsen (2012). On the connections between Gorgias’ *Defense of Palamedes* and Socratic literature see the paper by Alonso Tordesillas in this volume.
36 Murphy (2013).
37 Konstan (2011), 85-86.
38 Gábor Betegh thinks that the Socrates of the *Clouds* should be related to Archelaus and not to Diogenes (G. Betegh, ‘Spoofing Presocratic Arguments. Once again on Socrates in the *Clouds*’, paper held at the GANPH conference in Würzburg, Germany, from September 28 to October 1, 2010). Fazzo (2009) and Demont (2010) give thorough reconstructions of the physiological doctrines at the background of Aristophanes’ account.
39 Bromberg (2012).
the real Socrates.”

Cerri backs this claim by showing how the doctrines hinted at in the ‘meteorosophist’ passages of the *Clouds* (e.g. 93-96, 137-179, 187-189, 191-194, 200-217) match with those expounded in the autobiographical section of the *Phaedo* (95e7-100a9). Even the qualification *phrontistês* seems to go back to the “real Socrates”, as we can find it in Aristophanes’ well-known account of the *phrontistêrion*, in Ameipsias’ *Connos* (where the choir is made of *phrontistai*: Ath. 218c), in Plato’s *Apology* (18b7), and in Xenophon’s *Symposium* (6.6). Some caution should however be applied when combining these parallel passages, as their scope is by no means identical. The aim of the Comics is to attack Socrates and his pupils, while the Socratics, by referring to those accusations, try to show their groundlessness, or to deflect them on other intellectuals of the time. This is a main issue in Andrea Capra’s work, which is devoted to exploring the connections between Aristophanes and Plato. As Capra shows in detail, references to the Comics can be found even in lengthy dialogues of Plato such as the *Protagoras*. Here, Plato’s attempt is to distinguish between Sophists and philosophers, in order to deflect Aristophanes’ accusations onto the former.

We know that Plato eventually succeeded in establishing this dichotomy – but we also know that at Socrates’ death, when Plato still had to emerge as the most distinguished of the Socratics, the term *sophia* encompassed quite distinct strands of knowledge. It is a well-known fact that the eldest Socratic, Antisthenes, had been the pupil both of Socrates and Gorgias, and that among his writings were not only dialogues on a variety of issues, but also rhetorical exercises, such as the *Ajax* and the *Odysseus*. In order to gain a comprehensive view of Antisthenes’ thought his literary production should be therefore examined in its full breadth. A forthcoming volume edited by Vladislav Suvák attempts to do so, featuring contributions by major scholars in Antisthenes and Cynic tradition. Papers by Menahem Luz and Aldo Brancacci follow this trend, showing how Antisthenes’ views on education play a pivotal role for issues which are much debated also among other

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40 Cerri (2012), 157.
41 Capra (2001) and (2004). Capra’s work focuses also on other connections between Aristophanes’ and Plato’s works, i.e. between the *Clouds* and the *Symposium* (2007a), the *Knights* and the *Gorgias/Republic* (2007b), the *Assemblywomen* and the *Republic* (2007c). On these topics see also Capra (2008) and (2012). On the parallel issues between Aristophanes’ *Clouds* and Plato’s *Phaedo* and *Protagoras* see C. Caserta, 'Discorso Forte, Discorso Debole, Discorso Sicuro. Socrate nelle Nuvole, nel Fedone e nel Protagora' (forthcoming).
42 On the two declamatory speeches of Antisthenes see Djurslev (2011).
43 Suvák (2014), with papers by A. Brancacci, W. Desmond, L.-A. Dorion, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, G. Mazzara, L. Navia, and S. Prince. Other contributors to the volume are P.P. Fuentes Gonzáles, L. Flachbartová, S. Husson, G. Luck, C. Mársico, and A. Stavrú. Most of Vladislav Suvák’s work on the Socratics is in Slovak. See e.g. his commentary of Antisthenes’ fragments (Kalaš & Suvák [2010]), or the two volumes he edited (2006-2007) on ‘The Socratic tradition of thought from Antiquity to present’ (resp. 369 and 265 pages), with contributions by V. Suvák (Socratic movement), J. Gai-da-Krynicka (Socratic question), M. Fedorko (Irony), F. Šimon (Medicine), U. Wollner (Friendship), D. Olesianski (Dialectics), M. Poruhašak (Xenophon), A. Kalaš (Xenophon), D. Kubok (Euclides), V. Suvák (Cynicism), A. Kalaš (Cynicism and Stoicism), E. Urbancová (Cicero), M. Fedorko (Aristotle), M. Fridmanová (Arendt), M. Nemec (Patocka), M. Kriššák (Socrates’ Death), I. Komanická (Responsibility), D. Morse (Pragmatism), M. Kriššák (Guthrie and Nehamas), D. Kubok (Elenchus), D. Olesianski (Conscience), D. Rymar (Qualitative models), P. Labuda (*Euthyphro*), E. Andreinsky (Socratic Fallacy), J. Petřželka (Division of the Soul), F. Šimon (*Phaedo* 118a), E. Urbancová (*Natura* and virtue), M. Fedorko (Kierkegaard), D. Morse (Nietzsche), M. Kriššák (Patočka).
Socratics. Some of these issues can be found in later Cynics such as Teles and Epictetus, although a direct link from Antisthenes’ teaching to Cynic (and Stoic) tradition is not always traceable. The same difficulty applies to the doctrines which were taught in other so-called ‘Socratic schools’, e.g. the Megarian or the Cyrenaic: recent books by Ugo Zilioli and Kurt Lampe show that issues tackled by authors like Eubulides, Diodorus Cronus, Stilpo, Hegesias, Anniceris, and Theodorus belong to the context of Hellenistic philosophy, thus having little in common with the topics discussed among the first-generation Socratics.

Another Socratic on which scholarly work is ongoing is Aeschines of Sphettus. A new edition of his fragments is in preparation, and topics of the Alcibiades and the Aspasia parallel to those we find in Plato and Xenophon have been discussed in recent papers. This approach is valuable also for Socratics on which we have only indirect evidence: by reconstructing what we find about them in Aristophanes, Plato and Xenophon we can sketch out their intellectual world, and draw some hypotheses about their main tenets. Christopher Moore has applied this method on Chaerephon and Clitophon, providing useful portraits of these companions of Socrates.

The next Socratic to be talked about is Xenophon, whose Socratic writings have been studied with increasing attention since 2001. In the past three years this trend has even intensified: four new translations of his Socratic works have been published, as well as vast collections of papers both on his Socratic and non-Socratic writings. Of major importance are the proceedings of the Liverpool conference, which encompass contributions dealing with almost every aspect of Xenophon’s Œuvre. A similar approach characterized a conference that took place in Paris in 2011, the proceedings of which are in preparation, and the collection edited by Vivienne Gray. These endeavours show in a
The present state of Socratic studies: an overview

A paradigmatic way that no rigid division of topics and disciplines can be drawn in Xenophon: a holistic approach is therefore necessary for every enquiry on his work. This entails that even those who are interested only in what he reports about Socrates should take into account ‘non-philosophical’ writings such as *Cyropedia* and *Poroi*. As a matter of fact, ‘Socratic’ topics can be found in almost every work of Xenophon: this makes it critical to look for passages that Socratic scholars normally do not take into account, which are however useful for understanding peculiar aspects of Socrates’ personality and teaching.

Among the works devoted specifically to Xenophon’s portrait of Socrates, the Belles Lettres collection of Louis-André Dorion’s articles plays a pivotal role. Here we find coherent reconstructions of Xenophon’s Socrates’ most important philosophical notions, including *enkrateia, autarkêia, akrasia, sophia*, and *basilikê technê*. By reading these insightful papers the philosophical skills of Xenophon become evident, once more showing the inadequacy of the age-old commonplace that considers him as a dull didacticist, unable to convey the core of Socrates’ thought. A similar approach can be seen in David O’Connor’s chapter on Xenophon in the *Cambridge Companion to Socrates*. Here we find a thoughtful account of Socratic *sophia* and *erôs* presented in connection with other issues such as the common features between Socrates and Cyrus, or the accusations which led to the conviction of Socrates in 399. In fact, apologetic aims play a significant part both in the first section of the *Memorabilia* (1.1.8–1.2.64) and in the *Apology*. Recent papers by Michael Stokes and Robin Waterfield show that every enquiry into Xenophon’s defensive strategy must rely on a reconstruction that encompasses issues linked to chronology, politics, and religion. But there is more to it: defending Socrates from the accusation of corrupting the youth is possible only if one addresses his conception of love and friendship. Kirk Sanders offers an account of the way Xenophon assesses his relationship with Alcibiades, while Tazuko van Berkel shows how Xenophon’s ‘commercial’ language of reciprocity does not imply what modern readers have often labeled as...
‘utilitarianism’. How peculiar the personality of this Socrates is can be seen in two other papers addressing his ‘feminism’ (in Memorabilia 3.11) and his ability to produce laughter (gelopoiia) in interlocutors (in the Symposium). Since Vincent Azoulay’s seminal book it is clear that the charismatic features of Xenophon’s Socrates’ play a key role in his way of dealing with others, both in the microcosmic context of the oikos and in the macrocosmic one of the polis. As to the political attitudes connected to his personality, scholars still disagree whether these can be considered as matching with democracy or rather with oligarchy.

Another Socrates which has undergone great changes in the past years is that depicted by Plato. Recent scholarship follows the trend of broadening his picture(s) of Socrates by going beyond the ‘early dialogues’. A whole series of books follows this path, in the attempt to reconstruct lines of thought that stretch along vast portions of the Platonic corpus. David McNeill focuses mainly on ethical and political aspects in Gorgias, Protagoras, and Republic, drawing interesting parallels with Nietzsche. Laurence Lampert has a similar approach, being influenced by both Nietzsche and Strauss. He gives thorough accounts of the Protagoras, the Charmides and the Republic, paying attention to philosophical, dramatic, and historical detail. Even more dialogues (Apology, Theaetetus, Republic, Phaedo, Euthydemus, Lovers, and Sophist) are examined in Sandra Peterson’s seminal book. Addressing the question of why Plato’s Socrates seems to differ from dialogue to dialogue, she argues that all Platonic dialogues show Socrates concerned with “examining his interlocutor and so engaging in the central component of the complex activity, philosophizing”. The different views Plato puts in the mouth of Socrates are neither his own nor Socrates’, but rather those of the interlocutors Socrates is examining. According to Peterson, these differences therefore entail neither a development of ‘Plato’s thought’ nor a dichotomy between a Socratic and a non-Socratic period of Plato’s production: contra Vlastos, Socrates remains the same throughout all of Plato’s work. Another book tackling the Platonic corpus as a whole is that of Nikos Charalabopoulos. The thesis of this volume is interesting as to the much debated issue of the birth of the Socratic dialogue: as Plato’s writings are “prose dramatic compositions… i.e. works that consist of the words and deeds of their characters without the intervention of an authorial voice”, their meaning should be established “against the background of contemporary production

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62 Van Berkel (2010).
63 Calvo, T., “Does Xenophon’s Theodote Dialogue Make Socrates Out to Be a Feminist?”
paper held at the ‘XXIII World Congress of Philosophy’, Athens, August, 4-10, 2013.
64 Testenoire (2013).
68 See Gray (2011b).
70 McNeill (2010).
71 Lampert (2010).
of texts”, that is, as an alternative to contemporary theater plays such as those of Aristophanes and Euripides. Evidence on Platonic dialogue as a new type of drama, or ‘metatheatre’, can be found all across Plato’s work (the passages of the Ion, the Republic and the Laws being obviously of major importance). Charalabopoulos’ thesis is not new, but the way he expounds it is convincing, as he backs it dwelling extensively on evidence about the performance of Platonic dialogues in antiquity. This ‘performative’ aspect is tackled also by Laura Candiotto, according to which Plato’s dialogues were not only read aloud within the Academy, but also rehearsed in public places. Their main scope was therefore political, i.e. to purify the Athenian community from erroneous ideas. This happened through an elenctic practice which Candiotto labels as “retroactive”, as it involved not only Socrates’s interlocutors, but also, ‘behind them’, the whole audience assisting in the rehearsal. An approach not very different from Candiotto’s is that of Danielle Allen. She holds that Plato made use of his literary skills to effect a political change. By using language in a self-conscious attempt to shape people’s minds he thus managed to transform Athenian culture and politics through writings and public lectures.

Athens plays an important role in Plato’s dialogues. References to places Socrates used to visit within and outside the polis occur throughout the Platonic corpus, often providing the settings of single dialogical units. Two recent publications show how functional this topography is in relation to Socrates’ philosophical and political aims. These two aspects are closely intertwined in Plato, as in his view practicing the art of politics goes together with leading a philosophical life. Christopher Long deals with this in a variety of publications in which he shows that Socrates is the Platonic political ideal. Politics involves cultivating the ideals of justice, beauty and the good, which according to Long is possible only through the transformative power of Socratic speaking and Platonic writing. The relationship of Socrates with Athenian democracy is, however, problematic, as his prosecution in 399 shows. Studies on this well-trodden topic are still flourishing, with a strong focus on the early dialogues of Plato.

A topic linked to politics, to which much attention has been devoted in the past years, is that of Socratic eudaimonism. Different approaches to it can be traced in Plato’s dialogues. Socrates seems to avow two theses incompatible with each other: that of

73 Charalabopoulos (2012), 18-19. The issue of Socratic dialogue is debated in chapter 2: 24-103.
74 See Nightingale (2005) and Puchner (2010).
76 Allen (2010), on which see the review of Capra (2012a).
77 Nuzzo (2011) and N. Charalabopoulos, “Pilgrims to Athens: The Philosophical Topography of Plato’s Parmenides”, paper held at the conference ‘Plato’s Parmenides’, Chania (Greece), September 26-29, 2011.
78 Comprehensive overviews on Plato’s Socrates conception of politics are those of Griswold (2011) and Johnson (2013). On philosophy as the true political craft (Gorg. 521d) see Shaw (2011).
equivalence of virtue and happiness and that of the dependence of happiness on the possession of virtue. Christopher Bobonich sticks to the former: he maintains that Socrates holds a radical form of rational eudaimonism, according to which external circumstances (such as bad luck) can neither disrupt nor influence the agent’s happiness.\textsuperscript{82} Rationality, i.e. knowledge of what is good and bad, is therefore the only possible criterion for taking practical deliberations concerned with others in the way that most conduces to one’s own happiness. Terry Penner insists on the fact that according to Plato’s Socrates every action is generated by the desire for happiness, that is of ‘what is best for me’. This happiness is, however, not absolute, i.e. the maximum possible happiness anyone could ideally have, but the maximum of happiness as is available in a given situation, i.e. a “practicable happiness”.\textsuperscript{83} Such practicability depends on the knowledge of what is virtue, and such knowledge is general, being “the science of what is good for humans and of the means to that good.”\textsuperscript{84} These two aspects of Socratic ethics – the ‘particular’ one of the individual’s happiness and the ‘general’ one of the epistemic means necessary to achieve this happiness – harmonize in a paradigmatic way in the Lesser Hippias (372-376), where the goodness of persons matches with the functional good arising from knowledge of virtue. Naomi Reshotko sums up this train of thought as follows: 1. knowledge is the determining factor in eudaimonia, but knowledge is general and eudaimonia individual; 2. the pursuit of individual eudaimonia implies the concern for others’ eudaimonia; 3. therefore, eudaimonia cannot be pursued at the expense of others: Socratic eudaimonism prompts one to do what is good for oneself and others.\textsuperscript{85}

The passage of the Lesser Hippias gives a clue to the much-debated issue concerning whether Socratic ethics should be considered ‘egoistic’ or ‘altruistic’. Sarah Ahbel-Rappe deals at depth with this topic, showing how Socrates’ mission consists in bringing his interlocutors from a state of unreflective egoism into a state of harmony with the good, i.e. of freedom from self-interest.\textsuperscript{86} In doing so, Socrates pursues the interest of his interlocutors, who he strives to make ‘actually… happy’. Socrates’ ethics is therefore based on friendship, i.e. on his paradigmatic altruism. Ahbel-Rappe points out that this image of a selfless Socrates, who awakens his fellow citizens to virtue, is not only in Plato:\textsuperscript{87} we find it also in Xenophon and, as she claims, in Aeschines, whose accounts show up to which extent the exemplary force of the Socratic paradigm influenced his companions.

A recurrent issue in Socratic ethics is ‘intellectualism’.\textsuperscript{88} A recent book by Brickhouse and Smith discusses the most common views on the topic, proposing a new interpretation

\textsuperscript{82} Bobonich (2011).
\textsuperscript{83} Penner (2011), 265.
\textsuperscript{84} Penner (2011), 269.
\textsuperscript{85} Reshotko (2012) and (2013).
\textsuperscript{86} Ahbel-Rappe (2010) and (2012). On Socrates’ ‘altruistic’ ethics see also B. Coskun, ‘Socrates’ Dare to Care’, paper held at the ‘XXIII World Congress of Philosophy’, Athens, August, 4-10, 2013. On Platos’ Socrates’ use of irony and shame to bring about the desire for moral improvement see Piering (2010).
\textsuperscript{87} Benson (2013) dwells on the strategy Socrates uses in the Euthyphro to prompt to virtue. In this dialogue happiness consists in the health of Euthyphro’s soul, which is fostered by the performance of virtuous actions and the avoidance of vicious ones.
\textsuperscript{88} For an account on Socratic eudaimonia as seen by Xenophon see Vivienne Gray’s paper in this volume.
\textsuperscript{89} Sedley (2013) tackles this issue in books 5-7 of Plato’s Republic.
of it. Two main versions of Socratic intellectualism are credited among scholars: 1. desire is guided by reason, i.e. one desires what he thinks is good (Cooper, Irwin, Santas); 2. desire for the good guides reason, which has to work out the means to achieve such a good (Penner, Rowe, Taylor). Brickhouse and Smith reject both interpretations, claiming that appetites and passions are “conative psychic powers” which resist reasoning. It is therefore necessary to discipline them through knowledge-driven self-control or punishments. A disciplined condition is necessary for realizing that appetites are only apparent goods, and for transforming them into ‘weak’ desires that can be eventually handled by reason.

Ethical intellectualism requires a clear understanding of what ‘Socratic knowledge’ actually is, given the manifold disavowals of knowledge we have in the dialogues. Is it an expert knowledge that encompasses epistêmê, technê and sophia, thus forcing the interlocutor to become aware of his lack of knowledge (and need to care for himself)? Is such knowledge linked to rhetoric means, i.e. to a refutational strategy that implies a “conditional” or “reverse” irony? Or are we dealing with a self-knowledge that is at once epistemic and ethical, theoretical and aspirational, and concerned both with truth and personal responsibility? Is such knowledge coherently present throughout all of Plato’s ‘early’ dialogues, i.e. can we identify a distinctive Socratic method with a common epistemological presupposition? Or is it possible to go even further and argue that a theory of forms is implied already in the ‘early’ dialogues (e.g. in the Euthyphro)?

These questions show the variety of angles from which the issue of ‘Socratic knowledge’ can be approached. Its interpretations are of interest not only for grasping the ‘rational’ aspects of Socrates’ teaching, but also for tackling other issues of his personality such as Eros and religion. Conferences have been devoted to Plato’s depiction(s) of Socratic Eros as well as a major book and a variety of essays. The conference volume...
edited by Marguerite Johnson and Harold Tarrant deals with Socrates as ‘Lover-Educator’, the focus being mainly on issues related to the *Alcibiades I*.\(^{100}\) Last summer, the 10th IPS conference was devoted to the Symposium, with more than a hundred papers on a wide range of topics dealing with Plato’s different accounts of Eros.\(^{101}\) The book by Elizabeth Belfiore dwells on the role erotic art plays in Socrates’ multi-stage examination and protreptic programme. Socrates’ erotikê technê has five interrelated components: 1. Erotic desire; 2. Admission of ignorance; 3. Desire for wisdom; 4. Socrates’ claim to be “expert in erotic issues” (deinos ta erôtika); 5. Commitment to teaching others to pursue wisdom. Belfiore deals with *Alcibiades I, Lysis, Symposium*, and *Phaedrus*, and shows in detail how Socrates’ erotic art is connected with philosophical practice.

A link to rational speculation is evident also in Socratic religion.\(^{102}\) Mark McPherran examines Socrates’ religious beliefs showing how they were integral to his mission of moral examination and rectification. Drawing on previous studies,\(^{103}\) McPherran suggests that Socrates merged his religious commitments with those he derived from rational speculation. By doing so, he reshaped the traditional beliefs of his time in the service of philosophy. The result was a rational theology as we find in Plato, which was later inherited by philosophies such as the Stoic.\(^{104}\) Socratic religion also has, however, non-rational aspects, as John Bussanich demonstrates. Socrates had plenty of religious experiences.


\(^{102}\) This link is most evident in Socrates’ account of teleology, on which cf. the contribution of Fulvia de Luise in this volume.

\(^{103}\) McPherran (1996).

\(^{104}\) McPherran (2011) and (2013).
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(God-given madness, prophecy, the Delphic oracle, the daimonion, natural deities, Apollonian and Dionysian experiences) that influenced his arguments. Indeed, it is important to note the peculiarity of them. Anna Lännström has shown that the uniqueness of Socrates’ relationship with the divine characterizes not only his personal beliefs, but also his moral theology. ‘Divine’ knowledge plays a pivotal role in his ethics as well as in his educational programme. Such knowledge is based on his ‘experiences’, i.e. on what he actively thinks and does, but on what ‘happens’ to him. The most evident case here is that of the daimonion, a notion which survives many years after Socrates, becoming of utmost importance in Neoplatonism.

Concluding remarks

A complex picture emerges from this survey. We have seen that in the past years Socratic studies have been characterized by a variety of topics and approaches. Skepticism as to the solvability of ‘Socratic problem’ is still the main trend in scholarship, as Louis-André Dorion and Robin Waterfield have recently pinpointed. Another major trend is that followed by Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith. In accordance with Gregory Vlastos, they claim that a certain amount of ‘relevant’ Platonic dialogues feature a unitarian view of Socrates’ philosophy that remains consistent throughout these texts. This textual basis should provide a solid ground for investigating the main traits of Socrates’ thought such as ‘moral psychology’, ‘motivational intellectualism’, and so forth.

The present overview bears testimony of yet another trend, which is becoming more popular in the past years. Its main claim is that the ‘philosophy’ of Socrates is indeed beyond our grasp, but that his ‘personality’, i.e. his way of living, behaving, and dealing with others, can be reconstructed through an intertextual work on parallel passages in the

107 We owe to the Comics accounts of hidden aspects of Socratic religion: Albrile (2012).
109 See the studies of Jedrkiewicz (2011), Kenny (2013), and Margagliotta (2013), which provide an overview on the main issues related to the topic.
111 Dorion (2011) claims that the ‘historical Socrates’ is out of reach, and that every reconstruction has therefore to deal with the different Socrateses of tradition, i.e. the ‘Aristophanic’, the ‘Platonic’, the ‘Xenophontic’, and the ‘Aristotelian’. Waterfield (2013) follows a more radical path which had already been trodden by Montuori (1974): as the extant sources do not allow a safe reconstruction of the ‘philosophy’ of Socrates, we must rely on the historical evidence about him, i.e. the different reports we have on the political background of his trial.
112 Cf. chapter I (‘Apology of Socratic Studies’) of Brickhouse & Smith (2010), 11-42. Christopher Rowe (2012) rejects the idea of a division between ‘Socratic’ and ‘non-Socratic’ dialogues: for him, Plato remained a Socratic throughout his work – which entails that the whole Platonic corpus yields texts that are relevant for reconstructing Socrates’ thought. We find a coherent application of this principle in Boys-Stones & Rowe (2013), where passages of late dialogues (such as the Laws) are displayed as testimonies of Socrates’ thought.
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Comics, the Sophists, and the first-generation Socratics. Livio Rossetti has shown that a number of texts refer to a clearly recognizable ‘Socratic character’, whose communication strategies are represented in a unitarian way throughout the Sôkratikoi logoi. Rossetti labels these strategies as ‘macro-rhetorical’: they are similar to the ‘rhetorical’ ones of the Sophists, as they involve the emotions of the interlocutor and are aimed at changing his mind; but they are also different from them, as they have no doctrine to convey, being limited to freeing the interlocutor from his certainties. These traits of a Socrates ‘in action’, who ‘does things with words’ through psychagogic, protreptic, and maieutic means and does not impart any wisdom, enable us to “draw an intuitive portrait of his personality”. What we have here is, according to Rossetti, a “criterion for distinguishing the historical Socrates from the Socrates spokesman of Plato.”

This reference to the ‘historical Socrates’ has been, since Olof Gigon’s seminal book, a taboo. A remarkable feature of recent studies is its comeback. We find this expression in Giovanni Cerri’s account of the parallel passages on Socrates’s confrontation with contemporary physiologia; we spot it in the title of Andreas Patzer’s collection of essays, whose “aim is only one: to acquire knowledge about the historical Socrates”115. But we find it implied also in several essays of the present volume, such as those of Aldo Brancacci, Franco Trabattoni, and Michel Narcy. Recent works on the ‘way of life’ of Socrates116 seem to support this trend, as well as studies on various aspects connected with his ‘uniqueness’117 and ‘outward appearance’.118

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113 Rossetti (2011), 219. This book spawned a vast discussion, of which the issue nr. 30/2 (2012) of the Mexican journal Nova Tellus bears testimony (80 pages of it are a comment on Rossetti’s theses).
114 Gigon (1947).
117 See e.g. Stavru (2013) and David J. Murphy, ‘By the Goose, By the Rooster. Socrates’ Other Unusual Oaths’, paper given at the SAGIP conference, Fordham University, October 11-13, 2013.